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INTRODUCTION
The correlation of punishment to culpability stands firmly as the
1
bedrock principle upon which legislatures construct criminal codes.
Ordinarily, codes punish more culpable offenders more severely than
2
less culpable offenders who are guilty of the same crime. Occasionally, legislatures deviate from a perfect correlation. For example, legislatures might punish offenders whose extremely reckless conduct is
the cause of a crime as severely as those offenders who commit the
3
same crime purposely or knowingly. When, however, a code punishes
offenders who commit a crime with a less culpable mens rea more severely than offenders who commit the same crime with a more culpable mens rea, the disparity may signal not only “unenlightened penol4
ogy” but also constitutional impropriety.

1

See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18 (“[A] scale of crimes should be
formed, with a corresponding scale of punishments . . . .”); Bernard E. Gegan, More
Cases of Depraved Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 429, 467
(1990) (“[T]he most fundamental policy of any system of graded punishments is that
even the guilty should not be punished beyond their deserts. . . . [A]n offender’s
deserts are inextricably connected with his subjective state as much as with the harmful
consequences he caused or the circumstances in which he acted.”); James Boyd White,
Legal Knowledge, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1396, 1403 (2002) (“[L]egislative assignment of degrees of culpability to the different elements [of a crime] is to be the product of a reasoned judgment based upon the fundamental principle that the criminal law should
provide a graduated set of punishments to reflect graduated levels of blameworthiness.”).
2
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2–.3 (1962) (punishing reckless homicide
less severely than purposeful or knowing homicide).
3
See, e.g., id. § 210.2 (punishing homicide “committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” as severely as purposeful or knowing homicide).
4
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 250 n.65 (1980).
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Although the operation and precise statutory language of each
6
code varies slightly, the homicide statutes of six states—Alaska, Kan7
8
9
10
11
sas, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York —provide the
5

Throughout this Comment, I refer to as “extreme recklessness” reckless conduct
that (1) manifests an extreme indifference to the value of human life, ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.110(a)(2) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3402(b) (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-4(a)(1) (West 2005); (2) manifests depraved indifference to the value of human life, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 201(1)(B) (2006); (3) is eminently dangerous
to others and evinces a depraved mind without regard for human life, MINN. STAT.
§ 609.195(a) (2008); or (4) evinces a depraved indifference to human life, N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 2009). Additionally, I will refer to as the “passion/provocation defense” proof that the defendant acted (1) in the heat of passion
and upon serious provocation, ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.115(a) (2008); (2) in the heat of
passion resulting from reasonable provocation, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(2) (West
2005); (3) upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 213403(a) (2007); (4) under the influence of extreme anger or extreme fear brought
about by adequate provocation, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 201(3) (2006); (5) in
the heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of ordinary self-control under like circumstances, MINN. STAT. § 609.20(1) (2008);
or (6) under extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 2009). Although the statutory formulations of extreme-recklessness homicide and the passion/provocation
defense differ from state to state, the unavailability of the latter as a defense to a
charge of the former raises the same constitutional issue. State punishment schemes
that provide the passion/provocation defense in the case of purposeful or knowing
homicide but not for extreme-recklessness homicide may effectively impose a harsher
punishment for a less culpable crime. See infra notes 6-12.
6
See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.100–.120, 12.55.125 (2008) (amended 2009) (establishing purposeful homicide as murder in the first degree, punishable by twenty to ninety-nine years in prison; extreme-recklessness homicide as murder in the second degree, punishable by twenty to ninety-nine years in prison; and passion and provocation
as a defense to purposeful homicide but not extreme-recklessness homicide, punishable as manslaughter by not more than twenty years in prison).
7
See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3401 to -3403, -4704, -4706 (2007) (amended 2009)
(establishing purposeful homicide as murder in the first or second degree, punishable
by life or 147 to 165 months in prison, respectively; extreme-recklessness homicide as
murder in the second degree, punishable by 109 to 123 months in prison; and passion
and provocation as a defense to intentional killings but not killings caused by extreme
recklessness, punishable as voluntary manslaughter by fifty-five to sixty-one months in prison).
8
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 201, 203, 1251–1252 (2006) (establishing
purposeful homicide as murder, punishable by twenty-five years to life in prison; extreme-recklessness homicide as murder, punishable by twenty-five years to life in prison; and passion and provocation as a defense to purposeful homicide but not extremerecklessness homicide, punishable as manslaughter by up to thirty years in prison).
9
See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.185–.20 (2008) (establishing purposeful homicide as
murder in the first or second degree, punishable by life or up to forty years in prison,
respectively; extreme-recklessness homicide as murder in the third degree, punishable
by up to twenty-five years in prison; and passion and provocation as a defense to intentional killings but not killings caused by extreme recklessness, punishable as manslaughter in the first degree by not more than fifteen years in prison, a fine of not
more than $30,000, or both).
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most glaring examples of the “harsher punishment for less culpable
offenders” problem. With respect to homicide committed in the heat
of passion and upon reasonable provocation (passion/provocation
homicide), each code fails so dramatically to correlate punishment to
culpability as to call into question its compatibility with the constitu12
tional guarantee of equal protection. In these states, offenders who
purposely or knowingly cause the death of another person, while in
the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation, are punished
less harshly than offenders who cause the death of another person
due to their extremely reckless conduct (extreme-recklessness homicide) while in the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation.
Consequently, the more culpable criminal class is subjected to less severe punishment for commission of the same crime—homicide committed in the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation.
The “harsher punishment for less culpable offenders” problem
cannot withstand equal protection scrutiny. Legislation that does not
implicate a suspect class or impinge upon a fundamental right conforms to the Equal Protection Clause if the law bears a rational rela13
tion to some conceivable legitimate state interest. Courts often afford legislatures great discretion to develop solutions to targeted
10

See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:11-3 to :11-4, :43-6(a)(2) (West 2005) (amended 2007)
(establishing purposeful homicide as murder, punishable by thirty years to life in prison; extreme-recklessness homicide as aggravated manslaughter, punishable by ten to
thirty years in prison; and passion and provocation as a defense to murder but not to
aggravated manslaughter, punishable as manslaughter by five to ten years in prison).
11
See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 125.20–.25 (McKinney 2009) (establishing purposeful homicide as murder in the second degree, punishable by up to life in prison;
extreme-recklessness homicide as murder in the second degree, punishable by up to
life in prison; and passion and provocation as a defense to purposeful homicide but
not extreme-recklessness homicide, punishable as manslaughter in the first degree by
up to twenty-five years in prison).
12
In addition to the prison sentences outlined in the notes above, the sentencing
guidelines of all six states systematically burden, especially with respect to subsequent
offenses, offenders convicted of extreme-recklessness homicide. These offenders, who
cannot assert the passion/provocation defense, are sentenced more severely than offenders who can assert the defense to a charge of purposeful or knowing murder. See
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (2008) (amended 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4704 (2007);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1251–1254, 1256–1259 (2006) (amended 2009);
MINN. STAT. §§ 609.095–.168 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6 (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 2009).
13
See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“[A] classification cannot run afoul
of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity
of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is that legislation
is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
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problems “one step at a time, addressing [themselves] to the phase of
14
the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” Thus,
not only does “harsher punishment for less culpable offenders” legislation bear no rational relation to any legitimate state interest traditionally associated with criminal lawmaking—deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation, or rehabilitation—but it in fact undermines these
goals. While victims of the punishment/culpability problem do not
15
constitute a recognized suspect class, the problem presents compelling justifications for closer judicial scrutiny within the rational basis
16
framework.
The problem demands a theory and application of rational basis
review that accounts for the unique political and institutional concerns surrounding the calibration of punishment to culpability. Such
concerns are absent from consideration of most social or economic
legislation and contradict the fundamental premise of the “one step at
a time” paradigm. Civil legislation is often the product of compromise and competing factions. Criminal law, however, does not benefit
from dynamic evolution, which disrupts the punishment/culpability
equilibrium. Although legislatures establish general requirements of
culpability that purport to govern the entirety of their criminal codes
they lack the incentive to harmonize punishment and culpability over
time. Most criminal codes are the product of myopic piecemeal legislation—influenced by political pressures, such as strong-on-crime initiatives—that blind legislators to how a specific enactment fits into a
17
comprehensive statutory scheme.
Judges are better suited than legislatures to holistically evaluate
how well criminal codes calibrate punishment to culpability. Con-

14

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
See Susan R. Klein, The Discriminatory Application of Substantive Due Process: A Tale
of Two Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 453, 489 (suggesting that criminals are not a suspect
class but that, due to their political powerlessness, they nevertheless deserve judicial
protection).
16
Although this Comment advocates heightened judicial scrutiny of punishment/culpability problems within the rational basis framework, it would be inaccurate
to describe the argument as advocating for “rational basis with bite.” The Supreme
Court’s “rational basis with bite” cases have struck down discriminatory classifications,
without employing suspect-class or strict scrutiny language, on the basis of impermissible government purpose. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis,
85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 313-14 (1997). There is little reason to suspect that most punishment/culpability problems are intended by legislatures.
17
See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of
American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 644-45 (2005) (noting the general lack
of constituencies opposed to crime legislation).
15
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fronted with the problem ex post by a party prejudiced by an unjust
18
correlation, most states’ sentencing guidelines make judges primarily
responsible for meting out just punishment. The political toxicity of
any legislative attempt at harmonizing punishment and culpability
means that judges must ensure that the legislature does not “step[]
most harshly on those persons the state[] ha[s] systematically deemed
19
less culpable,” even when taking one step at a time.
This Comment proposes justifications for critical judicial review of
the “harsher punishment for less culpable offenders” problem. It argues that the problem’s most glaring and prevalent incarnation—the
denial of the passion/provocation defense to a charge of extremerecklessness homicide—violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection guarantee.
Part I provides a paradigmatic fact pattern illustrating the punishment/culpability problem and pinpointing the precise elements
of comparative unfairness that implicate equal protection concerns.
Part II evaluates the playing field of rational basis review and highlights the incompatibility of the doctrine’s basic assumptions with the
correlation of punishment to culpability. It argues that the “one step
at a time” paradigm inadequately monitors legislatures’ success in defining and applying culpability principles consistently to the entire
body of criminal law—an a priori definitional commitment missing
from the civil lawmaking enterprise. Part III, without suggesting that
victims of the problem constitute a “suspect class,” suggests the need
for more searching judicial inquiry into the punishment/culpability
problem. It draws on models of legislative default proposed by political-process theory and public-choice theory to underscore acute political and institutional concerns that the problem presents. These concerns highlight the ease with which the problem may crop up in
criminal codes and the importance of equipping judges with an adequate framework both for remedying current infestations and pre20
venting future ones. Part IV applies the proposed approach to the
most prevalent instance of the punishment/culpability problem—the
18

For examples of state sentencing guidelines, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
reh’g granted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
20
Though examining a statutory and not a constitutional issue, the Supreme
Court decided one case involving poorly correlated punishment and culpability this
past Term. See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009) (examining a
federal criminal statute punishing aggravated identity theft with mandatory consecutive two-year prison terms).
19
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denial of the passion/provocation defense to offenders convicted of
extreme-recklessness homicide. Entertaining and rebutting counterarguments that the denial of the defense may justifiably survive rational basis review, Part IV argues that the denial of the defense does
not rationally further any legitimate state interest but rather undermines the state’s interests in deterrence and incapacitation. Part IV
concludes by evaluating the analytically unsatisfactory attempts by
courts in New York and New Jersey to grapple with the passion/provocation punishment/culpability problem. The Comment
finally offers a brief conclusion.
I. THE “HARSHER PUNISHMENT FOR LESS CULPABLE
OFFENDERS” PROBLEM: AN EXAMPLE
To illustrate the “harsher punishment for less culpable offenders”
problem, consider the following hypothetical. Lenny Lessculpable arrives at his second-floor apartment only to find his unfaithful spouse
in the midst of a sexual rendezvous—a provocation that a jury might
easily deem “sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person
beyond the power of his or her control,” thereby triggering the pas21
sion/provocation defense. In response, Lenny throws him out of his
second-floor window and kills him. He defenestrates this adulterer
not to purposely or knowingly kill him, or even to cause him severe
bodily injury, but rather to disrupt the physical act of infidelity and
remove the adulterer from his wife and home. Although it is not certain that the fall will kill the man, it is probable, and Lenny chooses to
ignore this risk. If a jury finds that Lenny purposely or knowingly
caused the man’s death, it will next consider whether Lenny acted in
22
the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation. Undoubtedly,
however, a jury may alternatively find that Lenny acted without intent
to kill but rather recklessly or, even worse, recklessly under circums23
tances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. If the jury
finds the latter, Lenny cannot invoke the passion/provocation defense
24
in six states.
Now imagine a similar scenario unfolding in a twentieth-floor
penthouse. When confronted with the same problem as Lenny,

21

See State v. Oglesby, 585 A.2d 916, 923 (N.J. 1991) (outlining the typical doctrinal framework for passion/provocation homicide).
22
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2005) (defining manslaughter).
23
Id.
24
See supra notes 6-12.
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Maury Moreculpable screams, “I’m going to kill you!” and throws him
through the penthouse window.
Maury may invoke the passion/provocation defense because he purposely or knowingly caused
the man’s death, given that death would be practically certain to result
25
in such a situation and those six states would allow the defense. It is
difficult to imagine why, when confronted with the same reasonable
provocation, a defendant’s punishment should depend on the distance between his apartment and the ground—a difficulty that implicates the Equal Protection Clause’s command that “all persons similar26
ly situated should be treated alike.”
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE CALIBRATION
OF PUNISHMENT TO CULPABILITY
A. Contemporary Rational Basis Review Doctrine and
the “One Step at a Time” Rationale
An equal protection challenge to legislation that creates a punishment/culpability problem triggers rational basis review. Of
course, any legislative allocation of burdens and benefits creates discriminatory classifications that result in unequal protection of the
27
law. If, however, the legislation does not implicate a suspect class or
impinge upon a fundamental right, courts will refuse to invalidate the
law on equal protection grounds if the classification bears a rational
28
relationship to a legitimate state interest. A legislature need not articulate or produce evidence of the actual purpose of a discriminatory
29
classification. The legislation will withstand rational basis review so
long as “any reasonably conceivable state of facts . . . provide[s] a ra30
tional basis for the classification,” even if that set of facts is imagined
post hoc for litigation purposes.

25

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(b)(2) (West 2005) (defining the culpability level
“knowingly”).
26
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); see also
Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985) (noting that, like the Fourteenth Amendment, the New Jersey Constitution protects “against the unequal treatment of those who should be treated alike”).
27
See ELY, supra note 4, at 30-31 (illustrating how “we all order our lives” on legislative allocations of burdens and benefits).
28
See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40.
29
See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505
U.S. 1, 15 (1992)).
30
FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
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Legislatures do not act irrationally for equal protection purposes
by devising classifications that remedy certain elements of an identi31
fied problem and that neglect to remedy others. Rational basis review allows legislatures to move “one step at a time, addressing . . . the
32
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” For example, a state may combat environmental concerns by outlawing
nonrefillable plastic milk containers while refusing to prohibit equally
33
harmful nonrefillable paper containers. The deference afforded by
the “one step at a time” rationale acknowledges that “the give-and-take
of the legislative compromise process is bound to make subtle, even
apparently arbitrary distinctions as exceptions and exemptions are
34
created to mollify opposition.” If legislatures could not create such
exemptions for fear of invalidation on equal protection grounds, “legislative reform in the face of close political battles and powerful lobbies,” such as efforts to enact antidiscrimination laws, “might not pro35
By allowing piecemeal development of exclusionary
ceed.”
legislation, courts encourage creative legislative solutions to complex
36
social, political, and economic problems.
B. One Step at a Time and the Punishment/Culpability Problem
The “one step at a time” rationale, ordinarily well-suited to review
37
of most social and economic legislation, fails to justify judicial restraint in the face of a punishment/culpability problem. Defenders of
a poorly correlated punishment/culpability statutory scheme may
31

See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305-06 (1976) (per curiam)
(upholding the exemption of pushcarts in operation for more than eight years from
prohibition in the French Quarter); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S.
106, 109-10 (1949) (upholding a statute that forbids, so as to reduce visual clutter,
truck owners from leasing advertisement space on their vehicles but allowing them to
advertise their own products and services).
32
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
33
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472-73 (1981).
34
JAMES A. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION § 4:21 (2008).
35
Id.
36
See Note, Reforming the One Step at a Time Justification in Equal Protection Cases, 90
YALE L.J. 1777, 1784 (1981).
37
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229-30 (1982) (using rational basis review to
invalidate a Texas statute denying funds to children of illegal immigrants); Schilb v.
Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 364 (1971) (“The Court more than once has said that state legislative reform by way of classification is not to be invalidated merely because the legislature moves one step at a time.”); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 479-81 (1970)
(applying the “one step at a time” rationale to hold that, so long as Maryland promptly
furnished aid to eligible individuals under the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program, it did not have to fully meet each individual’s standard of need).
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employ the rationale to argue that legislatures are free to impose severe punishments on less culpable offenders before imposing them on
more culpable offenders. Given the liberty interests of the offenders
in question, however, criminal law strives to create a more just and
cohesive system of allocating burdens and benefits than ordinary civil,
social, and economic legislation. While judicial restraint encourages
dynamism in the civil sphere, it endangers justice in the criminal
sphere when disparities of punishment and culpability threaten core a
priori principles. The glue that allows for a cohesive system of criminal justice, unavailable in the civil context, is the careful calibration of
culpability to punishment. When “one step” is taken to dissolve that
glue, the result is not reform but regression.
1. Fraternal Order of Police I
The incompatibility of the “one step at a time” rationale with the
punishment/culpability problem emerged in Fraternal Order of Police v.
38
United States (FOP I ). The case presented a challenge to the “public
39
interest” exception of the Gun Control Act of 1968. The Act allows
states “to arm police officers convicted of violent felonies, and even
crimes of domestic violence so long as those crimes are felonies, while
withholding this privilege with respect to domestic violence misde40
meanors.” The D.C. Circuit noted that the government failed to offer any reason “for imposing the heavier disability on the lighter of41
fense.” Attempting to imagine a “conceivable justification” for the
scheme, the government invoked the Williamson principle, claiming
that Congress could punish the less culpable offenders (misdemea42
nants) as a first step. The court rejected this invocation of the “one
step at a time” rationale, noting that it “would allow a rougher notion
43
of justice than even ‘rational basis’ review allows.” While conceding
that “Congress may take one step at a time,” the court reasoned that
the guarantee of equal protection could not allow Congress to “step[]
most harshly on those persons the states have systematically deemed
44
less culpable.” This “systematic” assortment is unique to the criminal
38

152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998), reh’g granted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev’d
on other grounds, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
39
18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 923–928 (2006).
40
152 F.3d at 1002.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1003.
43
Id.
44
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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sphere. Implicit in the court’s reasoning is the conflict between the
aims of the “one step at a time” rationale and the goals of a properly
crafted criminal justice system. While the “one step at a time” rationale is meant to allow for the dynamic evolution of legal responses to
social and economic problems, a criminal justice system should aim to
treat like cases alike by means of a consistent correlation of punishment to culpability.
2. Fraternal Order of Police II
The D.C. Circuit reheard the case (FOP II) and vacated its holding
in FOP I that the Gun Control Act’s public interest exception violates
45
the Equal Protection Clause. However, it preserved its critique of the
“one step at a time” rationale’s application to the punishment/culpability
problem. After taking a more comprehensive view of the legislative
scheme, the court found that the public interest exception did not
present a punishment/culpability problem. The court determined
that, in its previous opinion, it had overlooked the nonlegal restrictions imposed by states, such as formal and informal hiring practices,
46
that may prevent felons from obtaining firearms covered by the Act.
The aggregation of punishments imposed by both state and federal
law, the court reasoned, offsets the Act’s prima facie disparity between
47
punishment and culpability.
The FOP II court’s rationale is inapposite both to most manifestations of the punishment/culpability problem and to the denial of the
passion/provocation defense to a charge of extreme-recklessness ho48
micide. The court interpreted the problematic legislation in FOP I
49
and FOP II as incorporating state law and practice.
The punishment/culpability problem remains, however, when there is no offsetting congressional or state legislation—for example, when the only relevant punishment is a creature of state law. In those situations, the
assumption underlying both FOP I and FOP II remains: a state violates
the Equal Protection Clause by stepping most harshly on those offenders it systematically deems less culpable.

45
46
47
48
49

Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Id. at 904.
Id.
See infra Part IV.
152 F.3d at 1003.
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III. JUSTIFYING HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF
THE PUNISHMENT/CULPABILITY PROBLEM
Although FOP I and FOP II emphasize the intuition that legislatures should be required to conform their criminal laws to the foundational principles of culpability upon which they are built, the D.C.
Circuit did not articulate a clear justification as to why more exacting
judicial review should be the primary mechanism through which to
guarantee such compliance. Courts have refused to extend suspect50
class status to criminal law offenders. Consideration of the institutional competencies and incentives of legislatures and judges, however, offers at least two broad justifications for heightened judicial review of the punishment/culpability problem within the context of
rational basis review: (1) legislatures have strong incentives to create
and subsequently avoid correction of punishment/culpability problems, even in the absence of any legitimate governmental reason to do
so; and (2) legislatures explicitly task judges with meting out just punishment.
A. Legislative Resistance to the Punishment/Culpability Problem
Legislators are often unsympathetic to issues of criminal law that
unjustly burden criminal defendants, such as the punishment/culpability problem. Two dominant theories—public-choice
theory and Michael Klarman’s extension of John Hart Ely’s politicalprocess theory—have emerged to explain the problem of “legislative
51
Coupled with the
default” in the criminal lawmaking enterprise.
practical consequences of piecemeal legislation, application of both
theories to the punishment/culpability problem justifies heightened
judicial scrutiny of the rationality of any legislation that punishes a less
culpable class of offenders more severely than a more culpable class
guilty of the same crime.
1. Practical Consequences of Piecemeal Legislation
Inspired by the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, more
than two-thirds of the states adopted reformed criminal codes in the
50

For a collection of cases denying suspect-class status to prisoners, see Twenty-Fifth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure (pt. 6), 84 GEO. L.J. 1465, 1494 n.2975 (1996).
51
See Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress
(Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 604 (“Academics
have developed at least two theories (political process and public choice) to explain
and predict ‘legislative default’ in the criminal procedure field.”).
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52

1960s and early 1970s.
Over the last thirty to forty years, most
amendments to those recodified criminal laws have undermined the
53
One result of this degradation has
legislatures’ earlier progress.
been the proliferation of “designer offenses,” seemingly redundant
crimes already addressed by general provisions of a code, such as the
specification of library theft as an offense separate from general
54
theft. Another result has been the distortion of culpability and punishment within the gradation of specific offenses, such as homicide.
As two scholars intimately involved in the process of reforming criminal codes have noted, “[T]he entire process of amendment by piecemeal legislation generally encourages changes without regard for
their impact on the overall consistency or rationality of the code,” with
55
“ad hoc amendments tend[ing] naturally to distort grading judgments.”
Although some punishment/culpability problems develop not
over time but in the first instance, the evolution of New Jersey’s homicide statute illustrates the vulnerability of a precisely regulated system
of punishment and culpability to the warping effects of piecemeal legislation. As enacted in 1978, New Jersey’s Code of Criminal Justice
56
contained no provision for extreme-recklessness homicide. Under
the 1978 Code, criminal homicide constituted manslaughter—a crime
57
of the second degree—when committed recklessly. Similarly, crimi58
nal homicide otherwise qualifying as murder under the Code, when
committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provoca59
tion, also constituted manslaughter. Under that version of the Code,
a homicide committed under circumstances justifying a passion/provocation defense subjected a defendant to the same punishment regardless of whether it was committed purposely, knowingly, or
with extreme recklessness. The 1978 manslaughter statute contained
52

Robinson & Cahill, supra note 17, at 634.
Id.
54
See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second
Save the States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 170 & n.6 (2003) (“For example, in Illinois, while there is a general theft offense, the Illinois General Assembly
has nonetheless added by amendment a special offense for theft of delivery containers
as well as other specific theft offenses.” (footnotes omitted)).
55
Id. at 172 (italics omitted).
56
New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, ch. 95, 1978 N.J. Laws 482.
57
Id. § 2C:11-4(a)(1), 1978 N.J. Laws at 541 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(1) (West 2005)).
58
That is, a homicide committed purposely, knowingly, or during the course of
certain felonies.
59
New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, ch. 95, § 2C:11-4(a)(2), 1978 N.J. Laws
482, 541 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(2) (West 2005)).
53
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no disparate treatment of offenders who caused death under passion
and provocation and therefore did not suffer from a punishment/culpability problem.
The Code was to take effect on September 1, 1979, but, before it
did, the legislature created the offense of aggravated manslaughter.
The legislature provided that criminal homicide constituted aggravated manslaughter, a crime of the first degree, upon the presence of
60
“circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” By
creating the offense of aggravated manslaughter, a crime that would
61
not “otherwise be murder [under the Code],” the legislature denied
those defendants who cause death by extreme recklessness the same
opportunity for mitigation afforded to those who cause death purposely or knowingly, thereby subjecting the former class to a harsher
penalty. In 1986, the legislature further exacerbated the disparate
treatment by upgrading the ordinary term of imprisonment for aggravated manslaughter from between ten and twenty years to between ten
and thirty years and the extended term of imprisonment from between twenty years and life imprisonment to between thirty years and
62
life imprisonment. Ultimately, the evolution of New Jersey’s homicide statute demonstrates that the process of piecemeal legislation
poses grave risks to a legislature’s fidelity to its definitional hierarchy
of culpability and punishment.
2. Public-Choice Theory
Public-choice theory explains why, in addition to the problems inherent in any attempt at piecemeal lawmaking, legislatures lack any
incentive to maintain a well-calibrated system of punishment and culpability. The theory envisions “the legislative process as a microeconomic system in which ‘actual political choices are determined by the

60

Act of Aug. 29, 1979, ch. 178, 1979 N.J. Laws 685 (codified as amended at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2005)). The 1979 amendment defined aggravated manslaughter as a criminal homicide committed by an actor who “other than purposely or
knowingly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” Id. A 1981 amendment substituted “recklessly” for “other than purposely or
knowingly.” Act of Sept. 24, 1981, ch. 290, 1981 N.J. Laws 1108 (codified as amended
at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2005)).
61
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(2) (West 2005).
62
Act of Dec. 8, 1986, ch. 172, 1986 N.J. Laws 876 (codified as amended at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2005)).
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efforts of individuals and groups to further their own interests.’” For
example, proposing or voting for a penalty enhancement, even
though it may result in a punishment/culpability problem for a particular offense, can further a legislator’s own interest by bolstering her
64
tough-on-crime profile. Such proposals “often sail through the legislature with little public complaint, even though privately legislators
65
recognize they contain serious flaws.” One legislator laments the
“enormous, almost hydraulic pressure to pass any criminal law bill that
66
is offered, unless you don’t care about [keeping] the job.”
The self-serving function of criminal law proposals makes seeking
a remedy to punishment/culpability problems in the legislature entirely futile. Public-choice theory posits that legislators, when considering questions of criminal law, “will be motivated by what consumers of this legislation are willing to pay for it, in such political currency
as votes, volunteer time, and campaign contributions, either provided
67
to the legislator or withheld from an opponent.” With respect to
homicide legislation, for example, even if the legislation presents a
punishment/culpability problem, prosecutors and those voters fearful
of crime will inevitably “outbid” any other coalition and succeed in in68
fluencing legislators. It is difficult even to imagine any viable coalition that could enter a competing bid. Most citizens simply imagine
69
themselves as potential crime victims and not as potential suspects.
As Dripps explains, “[I]t is perfectly rational for legislators to perceive
that there is considerable political risk, and very little return, to taking
the side of the suspect. . . . The few beneficiaries of such a courageous
70
political stand for the most part do not even know who they are.”

63

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGIS52 (2d ed. 1995) (quoting Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371 (1983)).
64
Robinson & Cahill, supra note 17, at 634.
65
Id.
66
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Interview by Stephen Haedicke with Dawn Clark Netsch, former Ill. State Senator, in Chi.,
Ill. (Mar. 18, 2001)).
67
Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice;
or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1079, 1089 (1993).
68
See id. (explaining that there are more potential crime victims and members of
the law-enforcement bureaucracy than potential criminals).
69
Lerner, supra note 51, at 610.
70
Dripps, supra note 67, at 1094.
LATION
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3. Political-Process Theory
When the political process does not afford meaningful participation to those classes burdened by legislative classifications, John Hart
Ely’s political-process theory advocates heightened judicial review of
those classifications. Believing that “the Constitution is overwhelmingly concerned . . . with ensuring broad participation in the processes
71
and distributions of government,” Ely argues that “it is an appropriate function of the Court to keep the machinery of democratic government running as it should, to make sure the channels of political
72
participation and communication are kept open.” As an outgrowth
of the framework espoused by Justice Stone in footnote four of United
73
States v. Carolene Products Co., Ely’s theory empowers judges to protect
“the chronic losers in the give-and-take of the political process,” usually minority groups subject to widespread hostility, from “majoritarian
74
institutions[’] . . . frustrat[ion] [of] the genuine democratic will.”
Although Ely did not envision the criminal class as a potential beneficiary of heightened scrutiny, the punishment/culpability problem
presents a compelling justification for its inclusion. Under the political-process theory, widespread hostility toward a disadvantaged class
75
establishes a prima facie case for its classification as a suspect class.
If, however, such hostility furthers a substantial and permissible legis76
lative goal, the prima facie case is rebutted. So while burglars may be
subject to great societal hostility, laws criminalizing burglary and imposing on burglars a comparative disadvantage are legitimate, as they
77
advance a clearly substantial goal: the promotion of public safety.
The suspicion that usually accompanies the disadvantaging of a class
subject to widespread hostility “is allayed so immediately it doesn’t
78
even have time to register.”
While some scholars have argued for broad application of the political-process theory to criminal rights and procedure, a narrow ap-

71

ELY, supra note 4, at 87.
Id. at 76.
73
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
74
Lerner, supra note 51, at 606.
75
ELY, supra note 4, at 153-54.
76
Id. at 154.
77
Id.
78
Id.; see also Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 165 n.138 (2007) (“Criminal status is a
choice and a socially disfavored one at that. Criminal laws burden criminals, but we do
not subject them to strict scrutiny.”).
72
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plication suffices to justify heightened scrutiny of the punishment/culpability problem. Applying Ely’s theory to the sphere of
criminal procedure, Michael Klarman writes that “[b]ecause the political process does not adequately represent the interests of those societal groups largely populating the criminal class, political-process
79
theory demands judicial superintendence.” Though the argument
for broad judicial vigilance over criminal lawmaking may be quite
compelling, one rationale for judicial scrutiny of the punishment/culpability problem can be gleaned from Ely’s basic “immediately allayed suspicion” framework. For example, there are myriad
reasons to immediately allay any suspicion raised by imposing burdens
on murderers that are harsher than those imposed on nonmurderers.
Such suspicion, however, is not immediately allayed by imposing burdens on murderers that are harsher than those imposed on other,
more culpable murderers. Because no substantial governmental interest is furthered by burdening less culpable criminals with more severe punishment, the concerns at the core of political-process theory
reverse the traditional posture of complacency toward laws that target
80
criminal behavior.
B. Legislative Contemplation of Judges as Primarily
Responsible for Just Sentencing
The comparative institutional competencies of judges and legislatures often dictate the degree of judicial deference granted to legislation challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. With most legislation, the investigatory power of legislatures coupled with their
democratic accountability make them the more appropriate allocators
81
of benefits and burdens. The “sentencing function,” however, “long
82
has been a peculiarly shared responsibility among the Branches.”
With respect to sentencing, legislatures not only lack the incentive to
correct punishment/culpability problems, but they often delegate this
responsibility to judges in recognition of the judiciary’s relatively su79

Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L.
REV. 747, 766 (1991).
80
Cf. Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1229-30 (2006) (noting that the inherently unsuspicious nature of criminal laws disappears when ex-offenders are burdened more severely than nonoffenders).
81
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (“The
Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for
the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new
requirement.”).
82
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390 (1989).
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83

perior institutional competence. Although legislatures occupy the
84
primary role in determining punishment, many legislatures also contemplate that judges will serve as the crucial mechanism in assuring
85
just sentencing.
As evidenced by most state sentencing guidelines, the sentence an
offender receives is more often a function of judicial, rather than leg86
islative, determination. For example, under the New Jersey sentencing guidelines, when a defendant has been convicted of a first- or
second-degree offense, a judge may sentence the defendant as if he
had been convicted of a crime one degree below that of the actual
conviction if the judge finds that specified mitigating factors “substantially outweigh” specified aggravating factors and “the interest of justice
87
demands” a downgrade. Such discretion would seem to be an easy fix
to punishment/culpability problems, especially to the denial of the
passion/provocation defense to extreme-recklessness homicide. Two
obstacles stand in the way. First, discretionary statutory authority cannot cure a constitutional defect.
If a particular punishment/culpability problem does violate the Equal Protection Clause,
the decision to remedy that violation—for example, by imposing a

83

See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The
Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 97 (1999) (explaining that Congress delegated the particulars of the new sentencing system to the
judiciary because it realized that legislatures are not the best “primary sentencing lawmakers”).
84
See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (“Selecting the sentencing
rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not . . . courts.”).
85
The issue of whether judges or legislatures are better equipped to correct punishment/culpability problems is distinct from the Sixth Amendment concerns surrounding sentencing that the Court has recently addressed. In Jones v. United States,
the Court stated that
the constitutional proposition that drives our concern in no way “call[s] into
question the principle that the definition of the elements of a criminal offense
is entrusted to the legislature.” The constitutional guarantees that give rise to
our concern in no way restrict the ability of legislatures to identify the conduct
they wish to characterize as criminal or to define the facts whose proof is essential to the establishment of criminal liability. The constitutional safeguards
that figure in our analysis concern not the identity of the elements defining
criminal liability but only the required procedures for finding the facts that
determine the maximum permissible punishment; these are the safeguards
going to the formality of notice, the identity of the factfinder, and the burden
of proof.
526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
86
See, e.g., supra note 12.
87
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f)(2) (West 2005) (amended 2007) (emphasis added).
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sentence one degree lower—cannot be discretionary. Second, judicial interpretation of the grant has imposed requirements that make
correction of certain punishment/culpability problems very difficult.
For example, the doctrinal requirements of the dropping-a-degree
provision make it ill-equipped to cure New Jersey’s own punishment/culpability problem regarding the denial of the pas89
sion/provocation defense to extreme-recklessness homicide.
Though the dropping-a-degree provision may not remedy punishment/culpability problems by its own force, it nevertheless reveals a
recognition by legislatures that the criminal classifications they make
must be subjected to final review by judges “where the interest of jus90
tice demands.”
IV. THE BIG CULPRIT: THE DENIAL OF THE PASSION/PROVOCATION
DEFENSE TO CHARGES OF EXTREME-RECKLESSNESS HOMICIDE
Having critiqued the incompatibility of the “one step at a time” rationale with the punishment/culpability problem, and having developed institutional justifications for more searching judicial inquiry,
this Comment can now consider whether a concrete manifestation of
the problem violates the guarantee of equal protection. Specifically, it
examines the problem of denying the passion/provocation defense to
charges of extreme-recklessness homicide. Imposing a more severe
burden on some offenders, those who in the heat of passion and upon
reasonable provocation unintentionally cause the death of another
person through extremely reckless conduct, than the burden imposed
on other offenders, those who in the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation purposely or knowingly cause death, bears no rational relation to any legitimate state interest.

88

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
89
Because “[t]he reasons justifying a downgrade must be ‘compelling,’ and something in addition to and separate from . . . the mitigating factors that substantially outweigh the aggravating factors,” State v. Megargel, 673 A.2d 259, 269 (N.J. 1996) (emphasis added), a judge cannot remedy the equal protection violation by simply
considering whether “[t]he defendant acted under a strong provocation” (a mitigating
factor) or whether “[t]here were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the
defendant’s conduct, though failing to establish a defense” (a mitigating factor), N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(b)(3)–(4) (West 2005) (amended 2007). With respect to extreme-recklessness homicide, the downgrade requires “more compelling reasons” than
those required to downgrade an ordinary first-degree crime. Megargel, 673 A.2d at 267.
90
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f)(2) (West 2005) (amended 2007).
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A. Common Law Understandings of the Availability of the
Passion/Provocation Defense to a Charge of
Extreme-Recklessness Homicide
When considering the rationality of the relationship between punishment/culpability disparities and legitimate state interests—such as
deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation—an appreciation of the
common law understanding of the offenses involved, though certainly
not dispositive, aids a great deal. Both the academic literature and the
case law interpreting statutes that adopt common law rules resoundingly agree that common law conceptions of culpability demand the
availability of the passion/provocation defense to a charge of extreme91
recklessness homicide.
The common law defined murder as killing another with “malice
92
aforethought.” The concept of malice aforethought, as judicially interpreted, encompassed both harboring intent to kill as well as wan93
ton recklessness. Regardless, however, of the particular mental culpability that existed in a given case, “both judges and commentators
[at common law] agreed: if the accused were seriously provoked and
lost control of himself in a heat of passion, he did not act with malice
94
aforethought.” The heat of passion negates malice, according to the
95
common law understanding; therefore, a homicide committed
through wanton or extreme recklessness must be deemed worthy of
96
mitigation when committed in the heat of passion.
Common law notions of passion/provocation and extreme recklessness still resonate among most courts confronted with the punishment/culpability problem. At least one commentator has argued
that since the passion/provocation defense was equally applicable to
intentional murder and extreme-recklessness murder under the
91

One commentator suggests that

[m]ost killings which constitute voluntary manslaughter are of the intent-tokill sort . . . . But if [the killer], in the . . . [heat of] passion . . . should intend
instead to do his tormentor serious bodily injury short of death, or if he
should, without intending to kill him, endanger his life by very reckless (depraved heart) conduct, the resulting death ought equally to be voluntary manslaughter . . . . [T]he great majority of modern statutes . . . take this broad view.
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.10(a) (1986).
92
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *195.
93
But see Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J.
537, 545 (1934) (arguing that malice aforethought included only intentional wrongdoing).
94
Gegan, supra note 1, at 450.
95
2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 155 (15th ed. 1994).
96
Gegan, supra note 1, at 456.
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common law, an express statutory reference to the defense’s availabili97
ty to charges of extreme-recklessness murder would be superfluous.
Although the New York Court of Appeals has rejected this argument
98
as a matter of statutory construction, the courts of most states whose
statutes employ common law language adhere to the common law
understanding. The Supreme Court of California has held that “a
killer who acts in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion lacks malice and
is therefore not guilty of murder, irrespective of the presence or ab99
sence of an intent to kill.” Therefore, common law understanding
dictates that a killer who “acts with conscious disregard for life, knowing such conduct endangers the life of another”—i.e., a killer who acts
with extreme recklessness—is entitled to the mitigation of the pas100
sion/provocation defense.
B. The Disparity’s Irrational Relation to Legitimate State Interests
By providing the passion/provocation defense to charges of purposeful homicide and denying it to charges of extreme-recklessness
homicide, legislatures fail to rationally serve any legitimate state interest and instead “step[] most harshly on those persons the state[] ha[s]
101
systematically deemed less culpable.” Courts ordinarily allow legislatures great discretion to further the traditional goals of criminal law102
making—deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
However, the denial of the passion/provocation defense in this in-

97

See id. at 456-57 (arguing that an extreme emotional disturbance defense to depraved mind murder should be implied under the New York statute).
98
People v. Fardan, 628 N.E.2d 41, 42-44 (N.Y. 1993).
99
People v. Lasko, 999 P.2d 666, 671 (Cal. 2000).
100
Id. at 668; see also id. at 671 (“Under the Attorney General’s approach, one who
shoots and kills another in the heat of passion and with the intent to kill is guilty only
of voluntary manslaughter, yet one who shoots and kills another in the heat of passion
and with conscious disregard for life but with the intent merely to injure, a less culpable
mental state than intent to kill, is guilty of murder. This cannot be, and is not, the law.”).
101
Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
reh’g granted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
102
See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (“Our traditional deference to
legislative policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution ‘does
not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.’” (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment))). This Comment does not argue that since the punishment/culpability
problem does not square with the most prevalent penological theories, it is a constitutional issue. Rather, the argument is that the punishment/culpability problem squares
neither with any penological theory nor with any legitimate state interest.
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stance irrationally undermines these, or any other, legitimate legislative goals.
Consider two possible arguments that the passion/provocation
punishment/culpability problem is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. One possible argument is that there is no punishment/culpability problem in the first place. States may rationally rank
extremely reckless conduct committed in the heat of passion above
intentional conduct committed in the heat of passion in their culpability hierarchy, with correspondingly disparate penalties. What legitimate state interest is served by this ordering? It is difficult to speak
of deterrence of conduct committed in the heat of passion and upon
reasonable provocation. As one commentator has noted, “persons
who temporarily lose self-control under the stress of great provocation
are both less likely to be deterred by the threat of punishment and
present less of a threat of further harm than those who commit the
103
same acts as an unforced expression of their normal characters.” To
the extent that persons subject to passion and provocation are susceptible to any deterrent effect, they will have more of an incentive to
act purposely under the current regime (i.e., to intentionally cause
death) than to act in a way that merely creates a high risk of death
(i.e., to act with extreme recklessness). In other words, Lenny Less104
culpable would be better served by shooting his victim in the head
than by tossing him out of his second-story window and insisting that
he harbored no intent to kill. Implementing such perverse incentives
does not rationally further the state’s interest in deterrence.
Perhaps the ordering may be justified as furthering the state’s interest in incapacitating more “dangerous” criminals. Those who act
with extreme recklessness may present a greater danger to society
than those who act intentionally. Certainly, criminal law may further
the legitimate interest of “remov[ing] dangerous persons from the
105
rest of society and incapacitat[ing] them from doing further harm.”
In the absence of passion and provocation, however, no state ranks extremely reckless conduct above intentional conduct, although some
106
rank them equally. From an incapacitation perspective, it would be
difficult to speak of Lenny’s conduct as somehow more dangerous or
potentially more harmful than Maury’s. With respect to Maury’s conduct, one death is certain to result. With respect to Lenny’s conduct,
103
104
105
106

Gegan, supra note 1, at 461-62.
See supra Part I.
Gegan, supra note 1, at 461.
See supra notes 6-11.
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107

no death is certain to result. If states did punish extremely reckless
homicide more severely than intentional homicide, the argument
would have greater force. Because no state operates this way, however, the incapacitation argument makes sense only if passion and provocation somehow change the hierarchy calculus. While passion and
provocation do change the calculus, their effects are as applicable to
108
intentional conduct as to extremely reckless conduct. If the mitigating effects were not equally applicable, another perverse result would
follow: mitigation would go “to those who intentionally do the greatest harm known to the law but [would be] den[ied] . . . to those who,
109
The punishhowever reckless, did not actually intend the harm.”
ment/culpability problem inherent in the denial of the passion/provocation defense to charges of extreme-recklessness homicide presents a rare instance of legislatures’ irrational pursuit of
110
legitimate state interests in the enterprise of criminal lawmaking.
A second argument that the legislative scheme rationally furthers
a legitimate state interest may challenge the logical compatibility of
extremely reckless conduct and conduct committed in the heat of passion upon reasonable provocation. This argument rests upon two irrational assumptions: (1) offenders who act with extreme recklessness
upon passion and provocation retain a mastery of their understanding
lost by those who act purposely and (2) sufficiently “hot” passion and
provocation inevitably draws forth only the most criminal and willful
acts. In consideration of the first argument, recall once again the ex111
ample of Lenny Lessculpable and Maury Moreculpable.
Although
Maury behaved more dangerously than Lenny, both men’s actions
crossed the threshold of reason and sound judgment. Whether this
threshold has been crossed, not how far past the threshold one travels,
determines the availability of the passion/provocation defense. This
107

As to other innocent third parties—for example, pedestrians walking below—
Maury’s conduct is as potentially dangerous as Lenny’s conduct.
108
See Gegan, supra note 1, at 462 (“The policy [of passion/provocation mitigation] is similarly applicable to those who kill intentionally or through gross recklessness.”).
109
Id.
110
An argument can be made that the perversity Gegan identifies stems from the
legislation’s failure to achieve its own tautological purposes. For example, defense
lawyers in Lenny’s case will have an incentive not to contest the issue of intent so as to
take advantage of the passion/provocation defense to purposeful, heat-of-passion homicide. Therefore, the practical consequences of the scheme will incentivize false
concessions of purpose in the hope of receiving a lesser sentence. See generally Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128 n.34 (1972)
(defining a statute’s “tautological purpose” as that “suggested by its terms”).
111
See supra Part I.
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threshold is understood as a “concession to the frailty of man” and as
the point at which “the average person can understandably react violently to a sufficient wrong and hence some lesser punishment is ap112
A variation of the Lenny/Maury hypothetical also dispropriate.”
poses of the second irrational presumption regarding passion and
provocation: that the heat of passion and a reasonable provocation
will inevitably inspire only the most willful criminal acts. Suppose
that, instead of throwing the man out his second-floor window with no
intent to kill him, Lenny had reached into his nightstand, pulled out a
revolver, and fired three shots into the man’s head, thereby entitling
himself to the passion/provocation defense. Once Lenny crosses the
threshold of self-control, reason, and judgment, there is no reason to
believe that the latter response is any more likely to occur than the
former. As such, one toils to imagine a reason why the former, more
constrained response warrants a more severe penalty than the latter,
more malicious response.
C. The New York and New Jersey Cases
The courts that have considered the issue have struggled to reconcile the promotion of legitimate penological goals with the seemingly irrational denial of the passion/provocation defense to those
who commit extreme-recklessness homicide. As of this writing, the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court is the only court in
the nation that has considered an equal protection challenge to this
113
particular punishment/culpability problem. The court devoted one
sentence of its four-sentence opinion to the argument:
Since the “heat of passion” killer ordinarily focuses on one person and
the depraved and reckless murderer usually acts more indiscriminately,
as in this case, we cannot say that the legislative prerogative to authorize
a mitigation-type defense to one crime and not the other is without a ra114
tional relationship to the purpose to be served.

The court reasoned that the differing patterns of violence underlying
the disparate treatment justify its existence.
The court’s justification for the disparity, however, is weak. The
Wingate court seems to equate focus (whether the killer had a particular target in mind) with culpability (whether the killer acted purposely, knowingly, or recklessly): a depraved and reckless killer is unlikely
112
113
114

State v. Guido, 191 A.2d 45, 55 (N.J. 1963).
People v. Wingate, 422 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (mem.).
Id.
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also to be a heat-of-passion killer, says the court, because the former
generally has a more indiscriminate focus than the latter. Factually,
this is clearly not always true. A depraved and reckless murderer can
act in a discriminating manner in the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation, focusing his attack on one particular person.
One such instance of an extremely reckless killer acting in the heat of
passion and upon reasonable provocation, but with a discrete target in
115
The court’s reasoning in Wingate,
mind, is Lenny Lessculpable.
therefore, provides no answer to the question of why Lenny should be
punished more severely than Maury.
Even if the Wingate court were correct (depraved and reckless killers act more indiscriminately than most “heat of passion” killers, who
act with a specific target in mind, and therefore should be punished
more severely), its reasoning would contradict the traditional culpability hierarchy established by most criminal codes. Leaving aside the issue of passion and provocation, even if a depraved and reckless killer
acts more indiscriminately than a killer who acts purposely or knowingly, no state punishes the former killer more severely than the latter killer, though some states, like New York, punish the former as se116
Consider, for example, an extremely reckless
verely as the latter.
driver who drives ninety miles per hour the wrong way down a one-way
residential street and kills a pedestrian. This individual clearly acts
more indiscriminately than someone who purposely shoots that pedestrian in the head. Nevertheless, no state punishes the more indiscriminate crime more severely than the less indiscriminate crime. For
the reasons discussed earlier, the introduction of passion and provo117
cation provides no reason for altering this culpability calculus.
The important issue for the court in Wingate should not have been
whether a heat-of-passion killer kills indiscriminately but rather
whether a heat-of-passion killer kills unintentionally. Other courts
and commentators, consistently with the example of Lenny and Maury
and the arguments advanced by this Comment, have noted that a
heat-of-passion killer may act with extreme recklessness, as opposed to
intent to kill, and have concluded that the passion/provocation de118
fense should be equally applicable to both culpability levels.
115

See supra Part I.
See supra notes 6-11.
117
See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
118
See United States v. Paul, 37 F.3d 496, 499 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994) (“While most
[passion/provocation] cases involve intent to kill, it is possible that a defendant who
killed unintentionally but recklessly with extreme disregard for human life may have
116
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey has examined the availability of
the passion/provocation defense to a charge of extreme-recklessness
homicide as a statutory, rather than a constitutional, issue with equally
unpersuasive results. The court reasoned in State v. Grunow that
“[t]he Legislature could have concluded, on the basis of common experience, that passion/provocation usually causes an intentional reaction and that it is rare for passion/provocation to lead to reckless119
The court further postulated that the legislature did not
ness.”
make the passion/provocation defense available to a charge of extreme-recklessness homicide, perhaps due to a legislative compro120
Because a killing that resulted from extremely reckless conmise.
duct was treated as murder at common law, the legislature “would rest
content,” the court imagined, with simply downgrading the offense to
121
In other words, the court’s response to
aggravated manslaughter.
the argument that an offender such as Lenny Lessculpable is being
subjected to disparate treatment forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause is simply, “It could have been worse.” Although Lenny, having
caused the death of another person through extremely reckless conduct in the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation, faces
ten to thirty years in prison rather than five to ten years, if the passion/provocation defense were available, the New Jersey Supreme
Court rests content that the guarantee of equal protection is met since
the severity of the unfairness could be greater. Lenny should be satisfied serving ten to thirty years, the argument goes, since the Legislature could well have imposed a sentence of thirty years to life. While
this reasoning may explain why the legislature chose not to provide
the defense to a charge of aggravated manslaughter, it fails to account
for the rationality of the resulting disparate punishment.
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s faulty comparative statutory
analysis in Grunow illustrates the difficulties courts have faced in recognizing punishment/culpability problems as violations of equal protection. Dissection of the court’s analysis reveals its focused attention
on the Code’s language and structure and its neglect of the constitutional problem at hand. To illustrate that New Jersey’s Code of Crimacted in the heat of passion with adequate provocation.”); 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra
note 91, § 7.10(a) (“Most killings which constitute voluntary manslaughter are of the
intent-to-kill sort . . . . But if [a defendant] should intend instead to do his tormentor
serious bodily injury short of death . . . the resulting death ought equally be voluntary
manslaughter rather than murder or no crime.”).
119
506 A.2d 708, 714 (N.J. 1986).
120
Id. at 712-13.
121
Id. at 713.
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inal Justice is “not without precedent,” the New Jersey Supreme Court
pointed to similar provisions of three other states’ criminal codes
(New York, Connecticut, and Oregon) that also prohibit the mitigation of extreme-recklessness homicide via the passion/provocation de122
Discussing Oregon’s passion/provocation statute, the court
fense.
noted that, like New Jersey’s, it does not provide for the mitigation of
first-degree manslaughter, a criminal homicide “committed recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
123
human life,” to second-degree manslaughter upon proof of the re124
quirements of the passion/provocation defense. This is an accurate
reading of both the Oregon and New Jersey statutes’ language and
structure.
The court, however, overlooked another subsection of the Oregon
statute that highlights a crucial distinction between the states’ laws—a
distinction rendering Oregon’s Code in harmony with the Equal Protection Clause and New Jersey’s Code resoundingly in discord. While
the Oregon Code does not allow the passion/provocation defense to
mitigate what would be extreme-recklessness homicide under the New
Jersey Code to a second-degree offense, the Oregon Code does not
allow the passion/provocation defense to mitigate a purposeful or
125
Under the Oregon
knowing killing to a second-degree offense.
Code, the passion/provocation defense only mitigates criminal homicide committed purposely or knowingly from murder to first-degree
manslaughter and not from murder to second-degree manslaughter,
126
The Oregon statute therefore does
as the New Jersey Code does.
not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the mitigating effect
of the passion/provocation defense is not needed for those offenders
who act with extreme recklessness in response to passion and provocation. An offender who, in the heat of passion and upon reasonable
provocation, recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting
an extreme indifference to human life is subject to the same punish122

Id.
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118(1)(a) (2007).
124
Grunow, 506 A.2d at 713.
125
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118(1)(b) (2007).
126
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2005) (“Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter when: . . . A homicide which would otherwise be murder . . . is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation. . . . Manslaughter is
a crime of the second degree.”), with OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.118(1)(b), 163.135(1)
(2007) (“[E]xtreme emotional disturbance . . . [is] a mitigating circumstance reducing
the homicide that would otherwise be murder to manslaughter in the first degree . . . .”).
123
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ment as an offender responding to an identical passion and provoca127
tion who purposely or knowingly causes death.
Oregon’s statutory
128
Therefore,
scheme is identical to Connecticut’s statutory scheme.
two of the three state codes cited by the court in Grunow do not share
the constitutional infirmities of New Jersey’s Code. While the New
Jersey Supreme Court is the only state’s highest court to have been
presented with the passion/provocation punishment/culpability
problem, the court in Grunow not only failed to offer an explanation
for the Code’s disparate treatment, but also failed to grasp the extent
of the disparate treatment and New Jersey’s outlier status as compared
to its sister states.
CONCLUSION
A criminal code that fails to calibrate punishment to culpability not
only deviates from established principles of criminal law but also raises
constitutional concerns. A code that punishes less culpable offenders
more severely than more culpable offenders guilty of the same crime violates the Equal Protection Clause. Like any governmental classification that does not implicate a suspect class or impinge upon a fundamental right, legislation that creates a punishment/culpability problem
must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The few courts
that have considered the issue have failed to articulate a principled basis
for deviating from the usual deference afforded by rational basis review.
The “one step at a time” rationale often employed in rational basis review has proven incompatible with criminal law’s attempt to create a
carefully calibrated system of punishment and culpability. The institutional and political challenges that accompany the correction of disparities between punishment and culpability justify heightened judicial review and reduced deference to the legislative process.
Six states deny the passion/provocation defense to charges of extreme-recklessness homicide, while offering the defense to those who
commit purposeful or knowing homicide. The high courts in at least
six states have an opportunity to develop coherent equal protection
jurisprudence to be applied to the punishment/culpability problem.
To be sure, victims of the punishment/culpability problem resemble
the traditional beneficiaries of Equal Protection Clause scrutiny in
127

OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118 (2007).
See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-54a to 53a-55 (2008) (establishing purposeful homicide under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance as manslaughter in the
first degree).
128
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very few ways. Nevertheless, the Fourteenth Amendment entrusts
courts with the responsibility to develop coherent doctrine to protect
all classes of persons, sympathetic or not, against injustice and unequal treatment.

